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This paper attempts a pre-factor analysis
of a series of possible attitude-clusters (&dquo;con-
structs&dquo;) and a suggested framework for
linking them that may help in predicting
foreign-policy decisional behavior or-what
probably amounts to the same thing-in
finding regularities in past decision-making
behavior. In the literature the paper may
be located as a possible middle course be-
tween the Scylla of quasi-psychological
speculation on &dquo;realism,&dquo; &dquo;power,&dquo; &dquo;moral-
ism,&dquo; and &dquo;national self-interest&dquo; of the
Morgenthau ( 1960 ) -Osgood (1953) school,
and the Charybdis of the complex concern
with personality, motivations, aspirations,
and goals of the Snyder-Bruck-Sapin school
(1962).
The relevant difficulty here with the
Morgenthau school is not the frequently
voiced charge of ambiguity or vagueness,
but the fact that the terms used have some
substantive &dquo;hard&dquo; content however ill-
defined. For instance, Morgenthau and
Osgood &dquo;define&dquo; national interest in terms of
&dquo;power,&dquo; and state in normative-ambiguous
terms that national decision-makers both act
to maximize power and ought to act to
maximize power. However, the scheme im-
mediately runs afoul of another fundamental
distinction, that between &dquo;imperialist&dquo; and
&dquo;status quo&dquo; nations; the latter apparently
have little or no power-lust and ought not to
have it (cf. Morgenthau, 1960, pp. 68-71).
The basic problem is that nations may maxi-
mize different things at different times, and
one value or goal may eclipse the other. All
motives that are defined in terms of specific
content are &dquo;impermeable&dquo; (Kelly, 1955)
and thus either conflict with (and may be
eclipsed by) other content-motives or, if
they happen to be universally present, are
useless in predicting differentiable interna-
tional behavior.
The Snyder decision-making school ap-
peared as an extreme reaction to the over-
simplification of the Morgenthau school
(Wolfers, 1959, p. 90), yet it immediately
became entangled in unmanageable com-
plexities. By attempting to trace down all
the motivational, temperamental, and value-
oriented antecedents to a given decision,
and despite their avoidance of the immense
problems that would have resulted from
deeper findings of motivational-content in-
consistency and cognitive dissonance, the
authors ended with an apparently unreplica-
ble scheme (see Singer, 1961, p. 84). Ad-
ditionally, the earlier mistake of specific-
content motives was in fact repeated. For
example, in analyzing the decision to resist
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aggression in Korea, Snyder and Paige con-
cluded that &dquo;the risks and costs of this course
of action were acceptable in terms of the
values at stake&dquo; (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin,
1962, p. 247). But despite its vagueness,
this is an extremely &dquo;concrete&dquo; (Allport,
1937, pp. 192-93) or &dquo;impermeable&dquo; (Kelly,
1955, pp. 79-81) motive in that it does not
refer to constants in human behavior that
could be transferred to other situations.
Similar particularistic motivations, values,
and goals are found throughout the Snyder
study. The result is a proliferating intellec-
tual ancestry of individual actions that re-
minds one of Mark Twain’s &dquo;proof&dquo; that the
human population has been decreasing with
each generation because every man alive
today had two parents, four grandparents,
eight great-grandparents, and so on back to
an immensely populous ancestry. It would
appear that content motives, however nu-
merous, would preclude replicability in other
decisional situations, for each unique de-
cision would seem to require at least one
unique content motive or a unique con-
figuration of the supersession of inconsistent
motives.
The need both for replicability and parsi-
mony (see Deutsch, Singer, and Smith, 1965)
would appear to require a search for more
abstract and transferable generalizations
about decision-making behavior.
Psychological Constructs
This paper is accordingly concerned with
identifying and structuring common per-
sonality regularities of predispositions to act
toward the foreign policy environment.
Terms which have been used to describe
personal proclivities include &dquo;determining
tendencies&dquo; (Allport, 1937, pp. 290-93),
&dquo;attitudes&dquo; (e.g., Smith, 1956, p. 33), &dquo;trait-
universes&dquo; (Stephenson, 1950), &dquo;world view&dquo;
(Cohen, 1961, p. 287), &dquo;conceptual systems&dquo;
(Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder, 1961), &dquo;an-
schauungen&dquo; (Klein, 1951, pp. 332-33),
&dquo;constructs&dquo; (Kelly, 1955), and, though it
has connotative difficulties, &dquo;stereotypes&dquo;
(Lippmann, 1922; Klineberg, 1954; Bould-
ing, 1959).
The term &dquo;constructs&dquo; seems best for
present purposes as it suggests an abstract
structure for construing environment. More-
over, it emphasizes the hypothetical nature
of the attitude-clusters and the fact that we
are dealing with generalizations inferred
from behavior (cf. MacCorquodale and
Meehl, 1948). A person does not have a
construct, strictly speaking, just as he does
not have happiness, humor, anxiety, or
any other &dquo;traits,&dquo; &dquo;attitudes,&dquo; or &dquo;factors&dquo;
(Keller and Schoenfeld, 1950, p. 154). For
these so-called intervening variables are in-
capable of direct empirical determination;
rather, the most we can say is that a person
demonstrates certain constructs by acting
(or responding) in a certain way. Actual
behavior is the independent variable from
which we may infer constructs (Skinner,
1953, p. 203).
This is by no means a pessimistic con-
clusion even though many people have
taken comfort in &dquo;explanations&dquo; of behavior
in terms of happiness, love, hate, hunger,
and thousands of other &dquo;attitudes.&dquo; For
these are false explanations, depending upon
unverifiable intervening variables. Rather,
the hope for a science of decision-making
lies in the fact that humans demonstrate
temporal constancy and strive for internal
consistency in their reactions to their en-
vironment (Kelly, 1955; Brown, 1965, pp.
549-609; Sampson, 1964, pp. 236-98),2
and accordingly we may be on our way
toward predicting behavior (thus &dquo;explain-
ing&dquo; it as much as empirically possible [see
2 Construct consistency may in part vary di-
rectly with the closedness of the cognitive system
(Scott, 1965, p. 81).
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Blalock, 1961, p. 5] ) if we identify con-
structs at the right level of abstraction.
Earlier convenient levels of abstraction in
other fields include the &dquo;authoritarian&dquo; line
of the J-type of Jaensch (1938), the F-scale
of Adomo et al. (1950), and the &dquo;field-
dependence&dquo; of Linton (1955). Scott (1965)
has suggested some intriguing correlates of
international images, and Robert C. North
of Stanford University has been working on
a domestic-international construct that in-
volves the identification of the perceived
&dquo;enemy&dquo; responsible for all social ills as
either one’s own country or (at the opposite
polar extreme) foreign countries. The actual
labels used to describe these and other con-
structs should not be invested with inher-
ently explanatory powers, any more than
early words invented to describe consisten-
cies of behavior such as &dquo;happy&dquo; or &dquo;humor-
ous&dquo; should be regarded as having any
meaning apart from the syndromes they
conveniently summarize. In other words, it
does not matter whether we say a man has
&dquo;X construct&dquo; or is &dquo;an authoritarian per-
sonality&dquo; ; what is significant is that he has
an attitudinal &dquo;correlation cluster&dquo; (Cattell,
1957, pp. 14-15 ) which includes traits such
as submissiveness to authority, anti-intracep-
tion, and conformity to conventional values,
and we can predict from the existence of
these that he also will probably manifest,
for example, a high degree of superstitious-
ness (see Adomo et al., 1950, pp. 744-83).
Constructs selected on a convenient level
of abstraction may, in addition, be arranged
orthogonally, which provides a much clearer
total picture of their interrelationships. In
Eysenck’s pioneering system (1954, pp. 108-
12), the abscissa is used to denote the con-
tinuum of conservative-radical political be-
liefs, while the ordinate is used for the
authoritarian-democratic construct. This
makes it possible to describe Communists as
located in the radical-authoritarian or radi-
cal-democratic quadrants, and fascists in the
conservative-authoritarian quadrant. With-
out such an arrangement, there would be a
considerable muddling of the two constructs
(as in fact happened in the early studies of
the authoritarian personality which hap-
hazardly equated authoritarianism with fas-
cism ; see Shils, 1954). A similar orthogonal
approach, involving four dimensions instead
of Eysenck’s two, will be used in this paper.
The basic problem is to select the appro-
priate constructs. The number of possible
constructs which may be inferred from hu-
man behavior is indeterminantly large, and
even factor- and component-analytical tech-
niques can only suggest a continuum of
theoretically possible constructs in which in-
clusiveness is purchased at the cost of in-
creasing vagueness. However, the task is
simplified if we exclude all areas of human
behavior that are irrelevant to decision-
making in a particular field such as foreign
policy. Numerous day-to-day attitude clus-
ters (such as &dquo;humor,&dquo; &dquo;sadness&dquo;) would be
of negligible relevance to foreign policy-
making. In addition, foreign policy for the
decision-maker is largely an abstract and
verbal task. The decision-maker does not
typically carry out his own policies; as a
general rule, the closer the decision-maker
is to the top the more remote he is from
the operational environment (Frankel, 1959,
p. 8).
Not only does decisional significance vary
inversely with field exposure, but reinforce-
ment typically occurs at the level of verbal
acceptance by colleagues of a proponent’s
policy, rather than direct stimulus feedback
from the environmental field in which the
decision operates. Moreover, it is hard in
foreign policy to reach a consensus that a
given policy decision was a mistake; unlike
the situation in all lower courts where an
erroneous decision can be reversed on ap-
peal, a foreign-policy decision is rarely sub-
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ject to authoritative revaluation. This in-
creases the abstract and verbal nature of
this field of endeavor.
For example, of the few foreign-policy
decisions of major powers in recent years
that have been generally criticized, how
many were or are perceived by the decision-
makers to be erroneous? According to Soren-
sen (1965) and Schlesinger ( 1965 ) , the
Kennedy administration felt that the Bay of
Pigs episode was based on false reports and
faulty intelligence, and that the CIA opera-
tions had acquired a momentum that could
not easily be checked. Moreover, even if
the Bay of Pigs decision itself was an error,
Kennedy and his advisers eventually felt it
was worth its cost in its educational value,
so that when the more momentous Cuban
missile crisis of 1962 came along, the earlier
logistic and intelligence errors of the Bay
of Pigs were not repeated. Or, taking the
Cuban missile crisis as an example of a
Kennedy &dquo;victory,&dquo; does it follow that
Khrushchev perceived it as a Soviet &dquo;error&dquo;?
Even this sort of formal logic does not ap-
ply in the area of foreign policy; Khrushchev
and his advisers may also have felt that they
&dquo;won&dquo; by the extraction of a pledge from
Kennedy that the United States would not
invade Cuba and perhaps by an undisclosed
&dquo;deal&dquo; (on which we can only speculate)
that Kennedy would reciprocate for the re-
moval of the Cuban missiles by removing,
six months later when the public would not
associate it with the Cuban episode, the
American offensive missiles in Turkey.
It may, of course, take a certain amount
of high-powered rationalization to find some-
thing good in every foreign-policy decision,
but it is safe to assume that decision-makers
responsible for the policies will do just that
(as all the various aspects of the Vietnam
debate reveal). Thus rationalizations tend
to reinforce initial perceptions. Moreover,
&dquo;perceptual processes commonly are ’reinte-
grative’ in character&dquo; (Leeper and Madison,
1959, p. 193); the prior perception will be
reinforced in later stimulus situations that
in part resemble the original one. Finally,
feedback from the consensus of colleagues
that large numbers of decisions were right
and wise may tend to overshadow whatever
criticisms come in with respect to particular
decisions. A possible example is John Foster
Dulles, who could ignore particular criti-
cisms of his policies on the basis of his be-
lief that in general he was doing the right
thing and that few of his critics, unlike his
close colleagues, could see the big picture
(Hughes, 1963).
These considerations suggest that con-
structs relating to foreign policy may be
more consistent, impervious to change, and
parsimonious than constructs affecting daily
behavior, which are often directly and physi-
cally contradicted by the hard facts of per-
sonal experience. The greater the distance
from the operative field, the more convinc-
ing is the general conclusion of gestaltists
that a person &dquo;lives only in terms of his dy-
namically-oriented perceptions, rather than
in terms of the objective realities&dquo; (Leeper
and Madison, 1959, p. 183). On the other
hand, these considerations do not help us to
identify particular constructs. The identifi-
cation and definition of a construct is, in
the first instance, intuitive, just as is any
scientific theory. However, it does not arise
in a vacuum, but rather out of a way in
which a person observes and generalizes
from events hitherto thought discrete. Once
a construct, or theory, is articulated, it is
then worked with and shaped and modified
in light of further observations and criti-
cisms of colleagues. This is the process by
which some of the constructs in this paper,
which have been invented and used by
others, arose in the first instance, as well as
the way I formulated and revised the con-
structs which may be original.
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Preliminary tests of the cohesiveness of
the constructs on Wellesley students (who
had no experience in foreign-policy de-
cision-making except for game simulations)
and by way of content analyses of a num-
ber of memoirs and autobiographies of twen-
tieth-century statesmen resulted in some
modifications of the construct components.
The method used may be described as a
rough pre-factor analysis, and the net result
is simply a set of working hypotheses. The
necessary next step would be to interview
decision-makers along the lines of the ques-
tions suggested below, and to undertake
content analyses (using several judges) of
the memoirs and papers of statesmen. The
application of factor and component analy-
ses of such data would undoubtedly lead to
further modifications of the definitions of
the constructs suggested here, or even to the
rejection of some of the suggested compo-
nents.
Four Foreign-Policy Constructs
Four constructs relating to foreign policy
decision-making, ordered dimensionally in
a concrete-abstract continuum (Harvey,
Hunt, and Schroder, 1961) starting with
the most concrete, are:
( 1 ) Systemic-Personalist: how the de-
cision-maker perceives the mechanism of the
environment of his decisions.
(2) Hawk-Dove: willingness to use
power and force.
(3) Incremental-Avulsive: degree of
change between present and former de-
cisions.
( 4 ) Flexible-Rigid: the degree of flexi-
bility in the preceding constructs.
These constructs, to be described in de-
tail below, are indicated in a polar form to
avoid ambiguity3 and also because consis-
tent negative answers to any given construct
test are equally valid as indicators of the op-
posite polar construct.
1. Systemic-Personalist
This first construct is of a lower order of
abstraction than the ones to follow, as it is a
way of perceiving the field of foreign policy
itself. It is peculiar to the field of foreign
policy and probably of little use elsewhere.
Yet it belongs to a class of constructs which
describe in polar terms how particular ex-
perts view their operational environments.
For example, lawyers may view law as a
whole or any individual case as a purposive
activity containing an internal morality that
strives for self-consistency and justice
(Fuller, 1964), or he may view it as a posi-
tivist set of commands to be interpreted
solely according to the intention, whether
good or bad, of the legislator (Hart, 1961;
cf. Tomkins, 1963). There are &dquo;progressive&dquo;
or &dquo;traditional&dquo; educators, &dquo;pure&dquo; and &dquo;prac-
tical&dquo; mathematicians, &dquo;fundamental&dquo; and
&dquo;technical&dquo; stock market speculators, and
macro- and micro-economists. Supreme
Court justices might be typified, with re-
spect to certain classes of constitutional
cases, according to a construct of defer-
ence or nondeference to popularly-elected
branches.4
3 As Cattell points out (1957, p. 87), the op-
posite to "north polar conditions" may in one
sense be "equatorial conditions" and in another
"south polar conditions."
4 Many jurimetric studies seem to adopt overly
simplistic constructs such as "liberal-conserva-
tive" or "activist-nonactivist." Justice Frank-
furter’s career demonstrates the futility of these,
as he was clearly a "liberal" in the 1930s and a
"conservative" in the 1950s (the country
changed!); he demonstrated judicial restraint
with respect to "political questions" but was an
activist on the issue of police brutality. How-
ever, all these decisions of his may be explained
on a deference-to-popularly-elected-branches
construct. In the 1930s Frankfurter "liberally"
approved Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation just
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The construct &dquo;systemic&dquo; is used to refer
to the perspective of the policy-maker which
embraces the international system in its
comprehensiveness and &dquo;exaggerates the im-
pact of the system upon the national actors&dquo;
(Singer, 1961, p. 80). It is the perspective
of the outside observer looking in. It finds
outside or &dquo;systemic&dquo; laws, such as balance-
of-power, coalitions and equilibrium, com-
munity, and international law, impinging
upon and largely explaining the operational
codes of other national policy-makers. For
example, the policy-maker in state A would
tend to discount the personal vagaries,
rumored motivations, and ambiguous ide-
ologies of his counterpart in state B, and
tend instead to predict the decisions of state
B in terms of the larger systemic principles.
The polar opposite construct, which for
want of a better word might be called &dquo;per-
sonalist,&dquo; is an inside-looking-outward per-
spective. The P-type policy-maker views
himself and his counterparts in other coun-
tries as manifesting complete free will in de-
ciding upon policy alternatives independent
of the theories of the international system,
guided only by personal motivations such
as lust for power or dedication to a political
ideology.
This dichotomy has previously been
viewed by Singer (1961) as two ways of
studying international relations, but what he
calls a &dquo;level-of-analysis&dquo; problem might just
as well be viewed as a &dquo;level-of-perception&dquo;
problem for the decision-makers themselves.
The tremendous dichotomy in the literature
between the systemic and the policy-oriented
approaches must be symptomatic of more
than mere scholarly convenience. If scholars
and analysts view the international field
from either of two perspectives, then de-
cision-makers (who increasingly coopt schol-
ars and analysts into their ranks) probably
do also.
With this as an initial hypothesis, a study
of decision-makers and many of their de-
cisions has suggested the following addi-
tional characteristics of the polar view-
points :
1. The S-type (systemic) readily per-
ceives international law as an attribute of
the international community, however primi-
tive the community may be, and he per-
ceives states as equal subjects of the law.
He usually does not think of international
law as something distinct from international
politics; rather, his experience under the
socializing aegis of international legal study
communicates to him a particular kind of
&dquo;consensus on the nature of the international
system&dquo; (Coplin, 1965, p. 617). Interna-
tional law deals with states as equals; it de-
fines their boundaries, the limits of their
sovereignty, and their reciprocal rights and
duties where jurisdictions overlap. Accord-
ingly, the S-type is accustomed to think in
terms of juridically equal states, to accept
the idea of the General Assembly’s one-
state-one-vote, and to think of state inter-
action as if states were checkers on an inter-
national checkerboard (and not as vastly un-
equal chess pieces). On the other hand, the
P-type (personalist) thinks of international
law as just another tool to be manipulated,
like &dquo;world opinion&dquo; or &dquo;morality,&dquo; and his
vision of international politics is not particu-
larly shaped or distorted by the way in
which he considers international law. He
will tend to act first and let the legal adviser
rationalize afterward. He generally has little
need or patience for the notion of states as
juridical equals, and would like to introduce
weighted voting into the General Assembly.
1.1. Law in general, including intema-
as he "conservatively" approved anti-Communist
and immigration-control legislation in the 1940s
and 1950s. He steered away from "political
questions" involving voting and legislation, but
did not hesitate to be active in nonlegislative
and non-Presidential areas.
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tional law, rests on a foundation of assumed
and expected reciprocity. The S-type will
readily perceive the reciprocity of events
and the precedent value of conduct that
gives rise to international standards (cf.
Fisher, 1961). For example, Adlai Steven-
son called the Connally amendment a &dquo;legal
boomerang.&dquo; He stated that &dquo;we can refuse
to be a defendant in the World Court, to
be sure; but by that same token, because
of the rule of reciprocity, we can hardly ex-
pect to be a plaintiff either&dquo; (1961, p. 962).
At another time, Stevenson took an anti-
Portugese position on the Angola question
following his pro-Portugese position on the
Goa issue, asking rhetorically (to Portugal’s
dismay): &dquo;Can exceptions be made from
standards of conduct we have all accepted
without risking that they will be followed
in other cases?&dquo; (1962, p. 389). Cordell
Hull’s memoirs show on nearly every page
an obsessive concern for precedents and
prior decisions of other secretaries of state
(1948). In contrast, the P-type will think
of the special circumstances of each decision
and have a deep distrust of analogies and
theorizing.5 This appears to have been the
kind of thinking behind India’s decision to
take over Goa in 1961 or the United States’
decision to intervene militarily in the Do-
minican Republic in 1965. There were per-
haps more instances in the Dulles period:
the stand with respect to Quemoy and
Matsu, the nonadmission of China to the
United Nations, the Suez decisions of 19566
(see Finer, 1964, pp. 506-07), the &dquo;massive
retaliation&dquo; threat, and the intervention in
Lebanon in 1958.
1.2. Because he views nations as entities,
the S-type is particularly troubled by di-
vided nations or ambiguous boundaries. To
President Kennedy, Vietnam was enigmatic,
yet to the more personalist President John-
son there appears to be no particular diffi-
culty in viewing the North-South struggle
as a case of international aggression. Ken-
nedy also had particular difficulties with
Berlin; he was most afraid of a Soviet move
there during the Cuban missile crisis
(Schlesinger, 1965; Sorensen, 1965). The
P-type, on the other hand, might be very
patient with a divided Germany or with in-
tervention in Vietnam. Intervention in
smaller countries per se characterizes P-type
decisions, as international legal concepts of
sovereignty and territorial integrity do not
appear as important restraints nor convey
significant promise of future retaliation.
The P-type will also agree to a &dquo;no sanc-
tuary&dquo; policy in a limited war situation.
When there are limits, he will emphasize
functional rather than geographical consid-
erations (see Snyder, 1961; Halperin, 1963).
1.3. The S-type will tend to be receptive
to multilateral treaties (&dquo;Treaties must con-
stitute the foundation on which any stable
peace structure must rest&dquo;-Hull, 1948, p.
5 It is important, particularly if one were to
undertake content analysis of Dulles’ speeches,
not to be misled by his recurrent "legalism" into
thinking that his view was that of an interna-
tional lawyer. As Hughes points out, Dulles
was a courtroom lawyer: "As Secretary, he
lived, acted, spoke, reacted, advanced, retreated,
threatened, courted, summarized, analyzed,
briefed, cross-examined, responded, appealed,
objected, thrust, parried&mdash;like a lawyer.... He
was, in effect, the prosecutor assigned to the
historic labor of arraignment, condemnation,
and punishment of the Soviet Union for crimes
against freedom and peace" (1963, pp. 204-205).
6 Hughes points out that Dulles ignored the
word "law" in his draft speech on the Suez
crisis despite the appropriateness of the term
and the fact that Eisenhower had just approved
a different draft containing numerous references
to international law, including the phrase,
omitted by Dulles, "We cannot subscribe to one
law for the weak, another law for the strong;
one law for those opposing us, another for those
allied with us. There can be only one law&mdash;or
there shall be no peace" (1963, p. 219).
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229) whereas the P-type will tend to dis-
trust multilateral treaties and conduct his
foreign policy on the basis of bilateral
treaties. It took an S-type Kennedy admin-
istration to push through the multilateral
nuclear test ban treaty of 1963, whereas
Secretary Dulles, a personalist, steadily un-
dermined multilateral control of peaceful
uses of atomic energy through the IAEA by
a series of bilateral nuclear sharing and con-
trol agreements between the United States
and other powers. However, if the subject
matter of the treaty is a military alliance,
the pattern is reversed. Here the P-type,
having a general &dquo;we-they&dquo; view of the
world (cf. Singer, 1961, p. 84), will prefer
multilateral defense pacts (such as SEATO
and CENTO under Dulles), whereas the
S-type will want the flexibility of bilateral
alliances that will make it possible to shift
allies if that is necessary to achieve systemic
equilibrium.
1.4. Finally, their view of states as part
of an international system makes it easier
for S-types to couple issues which are func-
tionally unrelated (see Fisher, 1964, pp. 97-
98). Kennedy, as mentioned, feared that
Russia would couple the Berlin issue with
the Cuban missile issue to trade them
off; perhaps Kennedy himself would have
coupled the issues had the positions been
reversed. But the P-type will tend to isolate
issues; in this sense he may be less likely to
escalate a local dispute into a world show-
down, but the price paid may be an inabil-
ity to solve particular disputes by trade-offs
with other disputes. The generally person-
alist Johnson administration was able to
order the bombing of Hanoi and of Soviet
missile bases around that city while at the
same time conducting normal relations with
the Soviet Union in the economic and non-
Vietnamese political spheres.
2. Lacking the systemic determination
of the S-type, the personalist decision-maker
tends to impute a great deal of free-wheeling
initiative and capacity for deception to his
counterparts in other countries. He puts
great emphasis in his speeches and writings
on the trustworthiness of other statesmen.
For example, James Byrnes in Speaking
Frankly rarely refers to &dquo;Russia&dquo; but rather
to individual Soviet officials (1947). Before
World War I, Henry Stimson expressed his
distrust of the Prussians due to their &dquo;martial
swagger&dquo; (Stimson and Bundy, 1948, p. 83).
He attributed his later success in achieving
good relations with Nicaragua and the
Philippines not to goal compatibility but be-
cause &dquo;trust begets trust&dquo; (pp. 114, 128).
It may be postulated, subject to later em-
pirical verification, that the P-type became
a P-type because of considerable personal
experience, whether in family life, school, or
business, of broken promises, dishonesty, or
blackmail. This experience may make him
generally distrustful of advice (as Kennedy,
an S-type, should have been with respect to
his advisers on the Bay of Pigs episode).
The P-type will delight in proving to his
enemies that they do not deceive him;
Dulles, for instance, frequently quoted
Lenin’s statement that &dquo;promises are like
piecrusts, made to be broken&dquo; (Berding,
1965, p. 137). The P-type will have a
&dquo;scrap-of-paper&dquo; attitude toward treaties,
whereas the S-type, for a variety of reasons
(see D’Amato, 1965) feels that treaties may
last even when those who signed them start
distrusting each other or are replaced by
other officials. The P-type may himself be
capable of considerable deception, whereas
the S-type may be genuinely shocked when
a great deception is practiced upon him.
As an example of the latter, when President
Kennedy became convinced that the Soviets
had indeed installed offensive missiles in
Cuba, he was privately furious: &dquo;If Khrush-
chev could pull this after all his protesta-
tions and denials, how could he ever be
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trusted on anything?&dquo; (Schlesinger, 1965,
p. 802).
2.1. The S-type is not necessarily naive;
rather, he is most likely to take at face value
the assurances of foreign diplomats if their
words coincide with the S-type’s perception
of what their systemically-determined for-
eign policy would be anyway. Given the
relative ambiguity of diplomatic discourse,
such perceptions might be reinforced in most
cases. The P-type, on the other hand, feel-
ing no need to evaluate messages against a
theoretical backdrop, is more likely to be
suspicious of all messages. In the summer
and fall of 1962, Senator Kenneth Keating,
possessed of no better information than the
Kennedy administration, proclaimed loudly
and often that the Soviets were installing
dangerous missiles in Cuba; by October he
was talking of offensive missile bases. To
Keating, a P-type, this possibility was at
least as likely as not, and Soviet messages to
the contrary were just as likely to be lies as
truthful. But to Kennedy, an S-type, Soviet
assurances that Soviet technicians were not
placing missiles in Cuba having an offensive
capability coincided with his perception that
it would make no systemic sense for
Khrushchev, who could reach the United
States with ICBMs anyway, to put offensive
missiles within Castro’s reach. Rather, Ken-
nedy feared at the time a Soviet move in
Berlin (Schlesinger, 1965, pp. 794-802).
The subsequent discovery that Keating was
right was indeed &dquo;incredible&dquo; (p. 801).
3. The S-type is decidedly less emotional
on questions of ideology, morality, patrio-
tism, and friendship than the P-type; the
former maintains a Wilsonian impartiality
and aloofness in his readiness to forsake old
friends and engage in new coalitions to pro-
mote systemic stability. The S-type &dquo;keeps
his cool&dquo;; in McLuhan’s analysis, the Ken-
nedy-Nixon television debates came out in
Kennedy’s favor because Kennedy was a
&dquo;cool&dquo; personality operating in a &dquo;cool&dquo;
medium, whereas Nixon’s &dquo;hot&dquo; personality
(a P-type in our terms) clashed with the
&dquo;cool&dquo; medium of television (McLuhan,
1964, pp. 329-31). The P-type is quick to
find friends and to uncover enemies, and he
soon escalates this propensity into a view of
the entire world from a &dquo;we-they&dquo; perspec-
tive. A rough content analysis of McGeorge
Bundy’s article, &dquo;Friends and Allies&dquo; (1962),
reveals an overwhelming preponderance of
human-oriented as opposed to theoretical
words; he repeats words such as proud,
brave, strength, character, interest, sympa-
thy, harmony, desires, mature, gallant, in- I
sight, honor, generosity, habits, energies,
convictions, conscience, integrity, and good
men and women. Dulles often seemed to
predicate this country’s alliance policy on
the sincerity and character of leaders of
other nations. For instance, he found the
ex-King of Cambodia to be &dquo;passionately
patriotic,&dquo; and was &dquo;much impressed&dquo; by
Diem of Vietnam, whom he found to be &dquo;a
true patriot, dedicated to independence and
to the enjoyment by his people of political
and religious freedoms&dquo; (1955a). He de-
tested Communist China because its &dquo;regime
has been consistently and viciously hostile to
the United States&dquo; (1954). Like McGeorge
Bundy, Dulles early concluded that &dquo;never
in all our history was there a time when
good friends and allies meant so much to
us&dquo; (1953b). He attributed the friendship
of allies to personal diplomacy, to coopera-
tion &dquo;forged out of constant personal ex-
change of views with our friends&dquo; (1955b).
Such preoccupation with friends and ene-
mies made it easy for Dulles to be a cold-
warrior, to state that &dquo;our proclaimed ene-
mies&dquo; who are &dquo;plotting our destruction&dquo;
control one-third of all the people of the
world (1953a).
4. The usefulness of any construct de-
pends on our being able in advance to indi-
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cate that a certain policy would be attractive
to a specified type of construct; thus ulti-
mately we are less interested in whether a
given person is of a certain type than in
whether a given policy can be characterized
as belonging to a set which would be attrac-
tive to policy-makers having the relevant
constructs.
Let us take two current examples: &dquo;fight
nuclear proliferation&dquo; and &dquo;support the
United Nations.&dquo; While everyone professes
to be against nuclear proliferation, S-types
do more about it-place it higher on their
priority lists-than do P-types. It is essen-
tially an S-type issue, for the systematist
greatly fears the systemic consequences of
a number of nations having the ability to
destroy others completely, and he is there-
fore likely to be deeply committed to re-
stricting the nuclear club regardless of which
nation is the next candidate to join. But the
P-type is more concerned with precisely
which nation is the N + 1 power; if friendly
and responsible foreign statesmen develop
their own nuclear capabilities, the world is
not thereby made significantly more pre-
carious. The problem to him is not the ab-
stract spread of nuclear weapons, but rather
keeping them out of the hands of enemies
(and perhaps letting them go into the stock-
pile of allies).
Second, it is again the S-type who will
actively support the United Nations as in
part an end in itself. The P-type, on the
contrary, will view the United Nations as
just another instrument of foreign policy, to
be made use of while it is around, but he
will not worry too much if it leaves the
scene. Dulles once wrote that &dquo;the United
Nations, like the Sabbath, was made to serve
man, not man to serve it&dquo; (1950, p. 57).
Moreover, the S-type would support an
international peacekeeping force since it
would help to assert systemic values, while
a P-type would be preoccupied with the
question of exactly who would control and
constitute the force and would probably op-
pose its establishment.
2. Hawk-Dove
The terms &dquo;hawk&dquo; and &dquo;dove&dquo; gained
great popularity during the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962 and have been endlessly re-
peated in connection with the Vietnamese
war. They cause relatively little confusion
in most instances, and indeed seem to be at
least as descriptive of foreign policy atti-
tudes as &dquo;liberal&dquo; and &dquo;conservative&dquo; are
with respect to domestic (but not to for-
eign !) policies. The &dquo;hawks&dquo; with respect
to Vietnam are those who would escalate
the bombing of North Vietnam, even to
saturation bombing (Madame Chiang Kai-
shek advocates atomic bombs). The &dquo;doves&dquo;
advocate deescalation and emphasize the
napalm-bomb killing of women and children.
On the other hand, it would be the hawks in
North Vietnam who would emphasize the
napalm bombs as a way of rallying the
population to greater efforts. In this sense
Henry Stimson was a &dquo;hawk&dquo; in World War
II in his advocacy of the release of photo-
graphs and motion pictures portraying the
horror of battle and bringing the war closer
to those at home (Stimson and Bundy, 1948,
p. 498).
The hawk thus will tend to advocate the
use of force in foreign policy, whereas the
dove will be reluctant to use force. The
H-type will tend not to be dissuaded by
moral scruples in fighting a war; for exam-
ple, Secretary Hull opposed the idea of
sending food to Belgian children in World
War II by arguing that it was the duty of
the occupying nation to feed the conquered
peoples and that &dquo;we could not afford to
assist Hitler by relieving him of this obliga-
tion&dquo; (Hull, 1948, p. 1052). After the war
the hawk will want to take drastic revenge.
Again, Hull serves as an example in his ad-
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vocacy of summary treatment of the &dquo;world
desperadoes.&dquo; He stated that &dquo;the instiga-
tors of the war, German, Japanese, and
Italian, should all be hanged&dquo; after a sum-
mary trial ( pp. 1289-90 ) .
The hawk-dove construct is simply a re-
wording of the toughminded-tenderminded
construct (Eysenck, 1954; cf. Rokeach,
1956; Eysenck, 1956) that applies to any
field of human activity. It would seem to
be a reasonable hypothesis that daily char-
acter traits of toughmindedness would indi-
cate a hawkish attitude in a person who
happens to be a foreign policy decision-
maker. The following &dquo;opinion statements&dquo;
were used in my classes at Wellesley Col-
lege to test these constructs, and they may
serve more clearly to define the constructs
than any other kind of description:
(&dquo;Agreement&dquo; or &dquo;strong agreement&dquo; with
any of the following indicates H-type; &dquo;dis-
agreement&dquo; or &dquo;strong disagreement&dquo; indicates
D-type.)’ z
The so-called underdog deserves little sym-
pathy or help from successful people.
Allowing insults to our honor to go unpun-
ished is dangerous since other nations will lose
respect for us.
Our society is in decay; we should return to
the fundamentals, to a more self-reliant way
of life.
Insofar as India wanted to remove a Portu-
gese enclave in her own territory, her action in
1961 with respect to Goa was justifiable.
We have overreacted against McCarthyism
and are now in true danger of subversion from
within.
During the Korean War, we should have
bombed the air bases in Communist China, as
General MacArthur advocated.
Force is often necessary to advance one’s
ideals.
Most of the students who protest the Vietnam
war do so because they are too cowardly to
fight.
The United States could use a tougher and
more uncompromising president like De Gaulle.
The &dquo;limited war&dquo; in Vietnam is a no-win
policy dreamed up by the civilian &dquo;strategists,&dquo;
and is against the sound advice of military
leaders who want to increase the bombing of
the North.
If one had to choose between freedom and
order in a society, order is clearly preferable.
The Supreme Court has gone too far in pro-
tecting criminals.
Violent and sadistic crimes should be pun-
ished by flogging and long imprisonment at
hard labor.
We ought seriously to consider the use of
atomic bombs in North Vietnam.
No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if
we have enough will power.
What youth today needs most is strict disci-
pline.
The businessman makes a greater contribu-
tion to society than the professor.
People suffering from incurable diseases
should have the choice of being put painlessly
to death.
Compulsory military training is essential for
the survival of this country.
It should be possible for any woman who
wants to, to have easy and legal access to an
abortionist.
Most religious people are hypocrites.
Those who make our foreign policy should
not be sidetracked by moral principles, because
the enemy does not obey the dictates of mo-
rality.
(&dquo;Agreement&dquo; with the following indicates a
D-type; disagreement an H-type.)
The death penalty is barbaric and should be
abolished.
Blood sports, like fox hunting, are vicious and
cruel and should be forbidden.
We should try to rehabilitate or cure crimi-
nals, not punish them.
One of the most criminal acts in world his-
tory was the dropping of atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Society must do everything it can to prevent
suicides.
A &dquo;white lie&dquo; is still a lie.
It’s better to be Red than dead.
7 Of course in the actual questionnaire the
questions were not grouped together, but spread
out among others testing for other constructs or
included as throw-aways.
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FiG. 1. Visualization of the systemic-personalist
(S-D) and hawk-dove (H-D) constructs in
relationship.
Thus far we have a construct scale as
shown in Figure 1. It is easy to justify the
orthogonal relationship. For instance, S-
types who are either doves or hawks will
agree on the desirability of halting nuclear
proliferation, but the hawk S-type in the
upper left quadrant might advocate the
bombing under UN auspices of the Chinese
nuclear production facilities, whereas a dove
S-type in the lower left quadrant would not
go so far as to bomb mainland China. Of
course, it may turn out later after more in-
vestigation that certain constructs cluster
with others (perhaps H-types and P-types);
if this is so, then more basic source-type
constructs can be identified.
3. I ncremental-Avulsive
Any of the preceding constructs may be
held in varying degrees of personal com-
mitment by a foreign policy decision-maker.
Thus we need a construct that measures the
degree to which a policy-maker will attempt
to change existing policy to shape it more in
the direction of his own constructs. The
notion of incremental decision-making (see
Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963; Cyert and
March, 1963) is a useful concept for de-
scribing the propensity to stick to existing
policy and change it as little as possible (cf.
D’Amato, 1967, pp. 10-13). Cyert and
March argue that decision-makers typically
engage in an &dquo;approximate sequential con-
sideration of alternatives,&dquo; accepting the
&dquo;first satisfactory alternative evoked&dquo; (1963,
p. 113). The alternatives examined are
usually marginal variations from the status
quo. If existing policy must be changed, an
incremental change-that is, a change in a
relatively unimportant variable or a rela-
tively unimportant change in an important
variable (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963,
p. 64)-is preferable to a large change.
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to
go as far as the preceding authors in sug-
gesting that the decisions are typically made
incrementally, although it is immediately
apparent that the State Department con-
ducts well over 99 percent of its day-to-day
business in that fasbion.8 Rather, we need
only set up a construct describing the be-
havior of an individual engaged in decision-
making that allows for a range between in-
crementalist and &dquo;avulsive&dquo; (a term invented
to denote drastic change). If the individual
typically behaves incrementally, then we
label him an I-type; the A-type exhibits the
tendency to come up with a decision that
would produce a large change in existing
policy.
8 Two important exceptional cases of mis-
reading of the opponent’s I-A construct are:
(a) the US Department of State’s "hard" posi-
tion on article 19 of the UN Charter, based on
the assumption, later proved false, that Russia
would at the last minute avulsively back down;
(b) Russia’s decision to place missiles in Cuba
in 1962, in part based on the assumption, later
proved false, that the United States would react
incrementally until the missiles were opera-
tional.
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The notion of incrementalism enshrines
and normatizes the status quo. This pro-
cedure has historically been rationalized by
conservative theorists such as Edmund Burke
and Alexander Hamilton. It may be said in
their defense that many advocates of &dquo;bright
new ideas&dquo; for changing foreign policy
do not sufficiently understand the wisdom
of existing policy. This indeed appears to
be the chief message of writers such as
Morgenthau (1951) and Osgood (1953);
their preoccupation with &dquo;realism&dquo; seems to
be nothing more than a general feeling that
&dquo;idealists&dquo; are often wrong. They argue, for
instance, that Wilson’s &dquo;moral crusade&dquo; to
&dquo;make the world safe for democracy&dquo; in fact
made matters much worse. Yet it does not
appear that Morgenthau nor Osgood quarrel
with the content of the ideals of the idealists
they criticize; rather they seem to be taking
issue with the limited vision of the idealists
and their propensity to take avulsive action
to implement their ideals. Thus the same
arguments should apply to nonidealistic
avulsive policy-makers, and indeed it would
seem that all the criticisms of Wilson that
Morgenthau mentions would apply equally
well to Hitler, whose foreign policies turned
out disastrously. The paranoid (see Tucker,
1965) and the idealist both want to change
the world avulsively. On the other hand,
sometimes the status quo if left alone can
lead to ruin. Avulsive action was needed to
stop Hitler in the late 1930s, and Morgen-
thau today appears to be calling for an
avulsive (and not very &dquo;realistic&dquo;) with-
drawal from Vietnam (1965).
These indeterminacies demonstrate that
&dquo;idealism,&dquo; &dquo;realism,&dquo; and even &dquo;paranoia&dquo;
are specific-content constructs, and thus it
makes no sense in general to attack or de-
fend them. But the incremental-avulsive
construct, in comparison, is abstract &dquo;source
data&dquo; (Cattell, 1957) for the previously de-
scribed constructs; it is helpful in predicting
policies, regardless of whether the subject
thinks he is acting to improve the world or
to defend himself against his encroaching
enemies. Since the I-A construct can indi-
cate whether the decision-maker is prepared
to insist upon implementation of his S-P or
H-D constructs, rather than going along
with existing policy that is unsatisfactory to
him, the I-A construct must be given a
third dimension relative to the others.
The following &dquo;opinion statements&dquo; may
help to further define the I-A construct:
(Agreement indicates I-type; disagreement
A-type. )
It is natural to fear the future.
I would not do something dangerous for the
thrill of it.
It is not wise to experiment too much with
our foreign policy; there’s a lot of wisdom in
what we’ve been doing all along.
If a policy has worked well in the past, it is
most likely the best policy.
If a change in policy becomes necessary, we
should strive to make it as small as possible.
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas,
but as they grow up they ought to get over
them and settle down.
(Agreement indicates A-type; disagreement
I-type. )
Life becomes meaningful if you devote your-
self to a cause.
All nuclear weapons ought to be turned over
to an international agency under United Nations
auspices.
The sooner we attack Communist China, the
better off we’ll be in the long run.
4. Flexible-Rigid
At the highest level of abstraction a con-
struct is needed which measures the degree
of variability of the other constructs along
their continua. No one is likely to be a pure
S-type or a pure P-type. Indeed, the de-
cisions one makes and the responses one
gives to questions will probably fall along
the S-P continuum; an S-type may upon oc-
casion make highly personalistic decisions.
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Nor would it be descriptive to take the
average of all the person’s decisions, for a
single point along the continuum could sum-
marize extreme variations or very close clus-
ters. Clearly the standard deviation would
be a useful descriptive compromise; it can
be plotted on either side of the mean to in-
dicate the normal variability range.9
The subject’s flexibility might be defined
in terms of the length of the standard de-
viation. But it would be more desirable to
add a different test, treating flexibility as a
separate construct. This is particularly im-
portant when the subject is new to the for-
eign-policy field or when for other reasons
we do not have sufficient data on him. He
may have been behaving incrementally,
waiting for an important opportunity to take
an avulsive step; for such a subject, it would
be important to have an independent mea-
sure of capacity for avulsive behavior.
An independent flexibility-rigidity con-
struct may derive its definition from the
openminded-closeminded construct devel-
oped by Rokeach (1960) or from the more
generalized cyclothymia-schizothymia con-
struct of Cattell (1957, p. 90). Owing its
intellectual ancestry to the studies of the
authoritarian personality, the Rokeach con-
struct contains many elements that are un-
related to foreign policy but may indicate a
relevant correlative to it. Some &dquo;opinion
survey&dquo; illustrations are:
(Agreement equals F-type; disagreement R-
type.)
Work is unrewarding if it requires too much
attention to detail.
Many of my friends would probably be con-
sidered unconventional by other people.
We can improve ourselves by living for a
while in a foreign country.
(Agreement equals R-type; disagreement F-
type. )
There is usually only one best way to solve
most problems.
It is natural that women be restricted in ways
in which men have more freedom.
&dquo;Op&dquo; and &dquo;pop&dquo; art have no place in the
National Gallery in Washington, D.C.
Perfect balance is the essence of all good
composition.
The United States and Communist China
have nothing in common.
Barring emergencies I have a pretty good
idea of what I’ll be doing for the next ten years.
I often become so wrapped up in something
I am doing that I find it difficult to turn my
attention to other matters.
There will never be a lasting accommodation
between Catholicism and Communism.
I have a work and study schedule which I
follow carefully.
It is always important to be on time for ap-
pointments.
Most people don’t know what’s good for them.
Most college courses start out with a real
promise of teaching theories which will explain
large bodies of knowledge, but wind up criticiz-
ing the theories and leaving you with nothing.
One should be very careful about attire and
manner of dress.
There’s too much emphasis in college on
theoretical topics and not enough on practical
ones.
Generalizing from these statements, it
may be said that a person is flexible or rigid
depending on whether he can or cannot re-
ceive, evaluate, and act on relevant informa-
tion unencumbered by his own constructs
( cf. Rokeach, 1960, p. 57). Deutsch and
Merritt (1965, p. 159) rightly stress the de-
gree of receptivity to new messages and ex-
perience that characterizes flexibility, and
whether inconsistencies in mental images
&dquo;are treated as occasions for distortion and
denial or as opportunities for learning.&dquo; A
flexible S-type, for example, might be in-
tellectually convinced that the world is best
9 The formula for the standard deviation,
given a set of numbers x1, x2, ... xn whose
mean is x:
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explained in systemic terms, and he might
act upon such beliefs most of the time.
However, when faced with information that
conflicts with his systemic construct, he will
be flexible enough to switch to a personalist
interpretation. For instance, if informed
that Khrushchev might be putting offensive
missiles in Cuba, the flexible S-type might
react in saying that despite the senselessness
in systemic terms of such an emplacement,
Khrushchev might not be thinking in sys-
temic terms (or he might simply be making
a mistake) and thus one should not be
caught wishfully thinking that the reports of
the missiles are false.
An independent test of the F-R construct
should then be compared to the standard
deviation of all the other constructs. Per-
haps an average of the two should be taken
to determine the final length that indicates
variability, although experience may dictate
the usefulness of a weighted approach.
By constructing a three-dimensional graph
of the S-P, H-D, and I-A scales, a cube
would be generated having as its dimen-
sions the standard deviations of the three
scales. The volume of this cube would be a
measure of the subject’s flexibility. The
number of unit cubes in this volume should
be compared with the index of the subject’s
flexibility as independently measured by the
preceding attitude tests, as previously sug-
gested.10 Then, on the same model, each
new alternative policy decision could be
plotted according to the observer’s evalu-
ation of its S-P and H-D location and the
degree to which it departs from previous
policy ( I-A ) . If this point in three-dimen-
sional space falls within the cube generated
by the subject’s constructs, we may predict
that he is capable of making such a decision
and probably will. Something like this pro-
cedure is unconsciously performed by every-
one who attempts to predict what a foreign
policy-maker, whom he knows, might do
with respect to a given policy alternative.
The present suggestion merely puts it into a
more sharply defined framework.
Further Considerations
The paradigm presented in this paper
could be equally adaptable to a group of
decision-makers or a country in the abstract;
there is nothing intrinsically different be-
tween a mind and a group of minds in terms
of decisional outputs. The only practical
difference, a big one, is that it is easier to
get non-foreign-policy decisional information
about individual persons and also to inter-
view them. Moreover, the personnel in a
foreign-policy decision-making group often
change, and this might lead to unmanage-
able flexibility. On the other hand, we
should not assume a priori that a person ex-
hibits greater constancy and more strenu-
ously avoids cognitive dissonance than a
group. When in past centuries England
acted as the balancer of power, she filled
this role with a constancy that was indepen-
dent of the personalities of the decision-
makers who came and went.
Another avenue for investigation might
be the identification of other constructs, for
the more dimensions that are used the more
likely the vaguenesses of any given construct
will be rendered less significant. However,
some constructs are conceivable which are
not at all useful. An example might be con-
sistency-inconsistency. This is of course a
valid construct: what one person sees as
consistent another may see as inconsistent,
despite all the strictures of logic (see Lecky,
1945). Some may see the United States’
support of Franco as consistent with other
aspects of its foreign policy, and others may
10 The independent test of F-R could be pic-
tured as the three-dimensional intersection of
the tesseract F-R.
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see it as inconsistent. Yet the construct is
not useful, for there is no objective test of
consistency so that the observer might be
able to plot a given policy alternative in
such terms. The constructs suggested in
this paper are the same for subject and ob-
server alike, whereas consistency is de-
pendent on a particular view of things that
may not be shared by subject and observer,
nor definable as among separate observers
acting as judges.
Intelligence is another construct that
would not be useful here. There is no way
of equating intelligence with particular
kinds of foreign policies. An intelligent de-
cision-maker might be very flexible or he
might be very rigid. So, too, an insane de-
cision-maker might have the rigidity of
paranoia or might exhibit purely random
conduct which the observer interprets as
high flexibility. Nor should this last possi-
bility appear disconcerting, since the F-type
is simply one who is ready to act on a basis
other than that suggested by his constructs;
random behavior is the most flexible of all.
And indeed, in the foreign-policy field, such
behavior might objectively be intelligent:
compare the intelligent strategy of the &dquo;ra-
tionality of irrationality&dquo; (Schelling, 1960).
Finally, it is hoped that even in the ab-
sence of further empirical study and refine-
ment of the constructs suggested in this
paper, the theories presented may be used
on a more impressionistic basis to help the
organization of analyses of the history of
foreign policy. Many articles and books
have been written on the themes of idealism,
realism, power, morality, isolationism, and
internationalism; perhaps some of the con-
structs suggested in this paper can also be
used as ordering concepts in this area of re-
search.
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